against two objections often raised against Semantic Minimalism. To get to that defense, we first need some stage setting. To that end, we begin with five stage setting sections. These lead to the first objection, viz., that it might follow from our view that comparative adjectives are context insensitive. We defend our view against that objection (not, as you might expect, by denying that implication, but by endorsing it). Having done so, we address a second objection, viz., that Semantic Minimalism makes it difficult to see what role semantic content plays in communicative exchanges. We respond and end with a reversal, i.e., we argue
that even though the second objection fails against us, it works against those who raise the objection. In particular, we show that Recanati ends up with a notion of communicated content that fails various tests for psychological reality.
Stage Stetting 1: Semantic Minimalism
Three features of Semantic Minimalism are important in the context of this paper (all elaborated on in Insensitive Semantics):
a) The most salient feature of Semantic Minimalism is that it recognizes few context sensitive expressions, and hence, acknowledges a very limited effect of the context of utterance on the semantic content of an utterance.
The only context sensitive expressions are the completely obvious ones ('I', 'here', 'now', 'that', etc., (essentially those Kaplan lists in 'Demonstratives', (1989, p. 489 ). These are not only obvious, they also pass certain tests for context sensitivity we spell out below.
b) It follows that all semantic context sensitivity is grammatically (i.e., syntactically or morphemically) triggered. c) Beyond fixing the semantic value of these obviously context sensitive expressions, the context of utterance has no effect on the proposition semantically expressed. In this sense, the semantic content of a sentence S is that proposition that all utterances of S express (when we adjust for or keep stable) the semantic values of the obvious context sensitive expressions in S).
Some illustrations: keeping tense fixed, 1 any utterance of (1) (1) Rudolf is a reindeer.
is true just in case Rudolf is a reindeer, and expresses the proposition that Rudolf is a reindeer. Any utterance of (2) (2) Rudolf has a red nose.
is true just in case Rudolf has a red nose, and expresses the proposition that
Rudolf has a red nose.
Any utterance of (3) (3) Rudolf is happy.
is true just in case Rudolf is happy, and expresses the proposition that Rudolf is happy.
Any utterance of (4) (4) Rudolf has had breakfast.
is true just in case Rudolf has had breakfast, and expresses the proposition that Rudolf has had breakfast.
Any utterance of (5) (5) Rudolf doesn't know that penguins eat fish.
is true just in case Rudolf doesn't know that penguins eat fish and expresses the proposition that Rudolf doesn't know that penguins eat fish.
If you find it surprising that we are writing a paper or (worse) a book defending conclusions so obvious, we have a great deal of sympathy. The problem is that a wide range of our contemporary colleagues rejects these views (It's probably no exaggeration to say that our views about (1)-(5) are now held only by a small minority of philosophers, at least among those who have thought about the surrounding issues.) In our book, we rebut these influential objections;
here we want to elaborate on some implications of the view defended.
Stage Setting 2: Speech Act Pluralism
Here's one way to summarize Speech Act Pluralism:
No one thing is said (or asserted, or claimed or…) by any utterance: rather, indefinitely many propositions are said, asserted, claimed, or stated. What is said (asserted, claimed, etc.) depends on a wide range of factors other than the proposition semantically expressed. It depends on a potential infinitude of features of the context of utterance and of the context of those who report on (or think about) what was said by the utterance.
It follows from this view that an utterance can assert propositions not even (logically) implied by the proposition semantically expressed. Nothing even prevents an utterance from asserting (saying, claiming, etc.) propositions incompatible with the proposition semantically expressed by that utterance.
From this it further follows that if you want to use intuitions about speech act content to fix semantic content, you must be extremely careful. It can be done, but it's a subtle and an easily corrupted process.
These points are connected to our defense of Semantic Minimalism because one underlying assumption in many anti-minimalist arguments is the idea that semantic content has to be closely connected to speech act content. If Speech Act Pluralism is correct, then no such connection exists, and so, this requirement is revealed to be a philosophical prejudice. (Another way to see the connection is this: If there really were (or had to be) a close connection between speech act content and semantic content, then all the data we think support Speech Act Pluralism would also serve to undermine Semantic Minimalism.)
At this initial stage it's worth highlighting one more aspect of Speech Act
Pluralism that has both wide ranging implications and sets our view apart from (all?) other contemporary accounts of context sensitivity. We don't think everything speakers say by uttering a sentence in a context, C, is determined by features of C. The speaker's intentions, facts about the audience, the place and time of utterance, background knowledge that's salient in C, the previous conversations salient in C, etc., are The Inter-Contextual Disquotation Test was our first and we feel a sentimental attachment to it. However, audiences tend to find it a bit confusing, so we'll leave it alone for now and direct those interested to our published work (Cappelen and Lepore (2003) ). Instead, we'll take our two tests involving indirect reporting and collectivity and turn to what most contextualists take to be a fundamental flaw in our position
First Objection: 'Tall'
We have argued that the contextualists candidates fail the various tests for context sensitivity. This applies to 'know', 'good', 'red', quantifier words, and so on. A standard reply is that there must be something wrong with our reasoning since words self-evidently context sensitive also seem to fail our tests: e.g., comparative adjectives like 'tall'.
So, for example, look at our first test: Suppose A utters in a context C 'Rudolf is tall'. Suppose that in C the contextually salient comparison class consists of giraffes. According to contextualists, the proposition semantically expressed by A's utterance is that Rudolf is tall for a giraffe. This result is rendered possible because 'is tall' is alleged to be context sensitive. But look at our tests: we take it as obvious that anyone reporting A's utterance can accurately utter 'A said that Rudolf is tall' and this is so regardless of the context the reporter happens to find herself in, i. cf., Insensitive Semantics, Chapter 5.) should be false, on the assumption that 'tall' is context sensitive. It's our intuition, however, that there are all contexts in which such utterances can be true; it's hard to see how that could be so if 'tall' isn't taking as its semantic value something the original utterances have in common -contrary to assumption.
Contextualists of every flavor have mocked, ridiculed, snickered, flat out laughed, and even worse, completely ignored our views because of these results. The current attitude seems to be that any argument that leads to the view that 'tall' is not semantically context sensitive must be seriously flawed.
There are at least three responses to our argument: a. Our tests are no good. b. Comparative adjectives do pass our tests, but for one reason or another, we can't hear the expressions as passing these tests. c. Or, you might say -That's right. These words fail the tests and they are not context sensitive -contrary to what we all once thought.
We have considered and replied to the first two options elsewhere (cf., Cappelen and Lepore (2003) To this end, we'll tease out our critics' argument; and try to establish it has nothing to do with semantics but rather reflects a metaphysical concern -which we'll call the Metaphysical Objection.
The objection to the view that 'tall' is context insensitive starts out innocently enough. Our contextualist opponents object: 'Are you insane! Of course, there can be both true and false utterances of (6):
(6) Osama Bin Laden is tall.
If in one context the topic of discussion is the heights of NBA players, your utterance will be taken to be false; and if in another, the topic is the heights of Saudi Arabians, your utterance will be taken to be true. For Contextualists context shifting intuitions are to be taken quite seriously. We couldn't agree more; however, our Speech Act Pluralism can accommodate the same data. In one context, the utterance says something true and in another an utterance of the same sentence says something false. But intuitions about the speech act content of these distinct utterances are not reliable guides to semantic content, and so, intuitions about the former need not be a good guide for conclusions about the latter.
The Contextualist, of course, will not cave in so easily; he'll say that it follows from Semantic Minimalism that every utterance of (6) is true and every utterance of its negation is false.
Here's a quick reply: According to us, (6) semantically expresses a proposition and has interpretive truth conditions which we can articulate as (6 tc ) and (6 p ):
(6 TC ) 'Osama Bin Laden is tall' is true iff Osama Bin Laden is tall.
(6 P ) 'Osama Bin Laden is tall' semantically expresses the proposition that Osama Bin Laden is tall.
Is the proposition on the right hand side of (6 P ) true or false? Though we take the answers to these various questions to be quite obvious, we also realize that sticking to our position is almost impossible (certainly unrewarding) since all the people that we like to talk to about these issues seem to loose interest if we don't elaborate. So: partially for selfish reasons (we don't want people to ignore us), partly out of the goodness of our hearts (we seek philosophical harmony), we'll engage in a little bit of metaphysics. 
First (and only) Digression: Being tall for an F is no better than being tall
Suppose you're baffled by the idea that there's such a thing as tallness.
We'll now try to show that if you are, you should be equally baffled by the idea that there is such a thing as, for example, being tall for a giraffe, or more generally, the sort of property expressed by being tall for an F. Holding these simple giraffe facts in mind, consider two giraffes, say, A and B. What would it be for A and B to be tall for giraffes? The problem is this:
There are many ways to be tall for giraffe. For starters, there are indefinitely many ways to measure the tallness of giraffes. Consider these few illustrations. A giraffe's height can be measured:
-From bottom of his hoof to the fleshy tip of his ear with a self-stretched neck; -From the bottom of a hoof to the tip of his snout with a self-stretched neck; -From the bottom of a hoof to the hairy tip of an ear with a self-stretched neck; -From the bottom of a hoof to the tip of a snout when standing on his back legs with his front legs lifted into the air; -All of the above, with an artificially stretched neck, i.e., by a machine or something else that can stretch the neck out further than the giraffe can by herself. (Remember, some giraffes are arthritic, and have very stiff necks).
Then, of course, there's the question of which comparison class or property or whatever we are to compare any given giraffe to. Here are but a few options:
-All living giraffes; -A stereotypical giraffe; -French giraffes; -All giraffes that have ever lived, are alive, and will ever live; -All possible giraffes;
-All giraffes in the vicinity of a certain giraffe.
Then, of course, there's the question of the (optimum) conditions under which to measure a particular giraffe (holding the method of measurement and the comparison class fixed). Here are but a few of indefinitely many options:
-Right after a bath (giraffes shrink a bit after having taken a bath); -Right after a long walk (their hoofs wear down); -When dead (again, death shrinks us all); -When hungry (they tend to stretch their necks further); -When pregnant (their necks are rendered less flexible)
Let's stop here even though there much else that has to be settled: but now ask yourself: What is it to be tall for a giraffe? What is giraffe-tallness? It all depends on which giraffes you compare any given giraffe to, how you measure it, the conditions of the giraffe when being measured, and so on. The 'and so on' is vital. There are no obvious or a priori limits on the different variations on giraffetallness.
Just to remind you why this matters: We're imagining a Contextualist opponent who's completely baffled by the idea that there's such a things as tallness and that it can be the semantic value of 'tall'. We've just tried to make that seem a little less peculiar by showing that the kind of worry that might trigger befuddlement with respect to tallness should also, if legitimate, trigger befuddlement with respect to being tall for a giraffe. Now, since we expect at least some of opponents to be completely non-befuddled about being tall for a giraffe, this might remove or alleviate some of their resistance to tallness.
Of course, we expect many opponents to say: 'Of course, there's no such thing as being tall for a giraffe simpliciter. You have to fill it out: you have to add something about the class of giraffes, the condition of the giraffes and the measuring methods.' To these critics we say: OK, just do it. Let's see how that gets incorporated into a semantics, and then we'll continue the debate.
Second Objection: Role of Semantic Content in Communication
Remember, according to Speech Act Pluralism, speakers use sentences to make claims, assertions, suggestions, requests, claims, statements, raise hypothesis, inquiries, etc., the contents of which can be (and typically are) radically different from the semantic contents of (the propositions semantically expressed by) these utterances. 
Reply to Second Objection: Semantic Content Does Have a Role
We think the answer is simple and obvious but we can't over emphasize its importance. We begin by reminding you of some basic facts about communication. Then we respond directly to this Psychological Challenge. What we are about to say presupposes there being a clear notion of a shared context.
We doubt there is one, but we'll place our reservations to the side for now. If there's no such thing as a shared context, then that will make life even harder for the Contextualist. Audiences and speakers are both often wrong (or have incomplete information) about the context that they find themselves in, e.g., about:
a) Basic Facts About Speakers and Audiences who Share a Context
o What their perceptual environment is; and o What the contents of preceding conversations were.
Speakers and audiences know that they can be wrong and have incomplete information about each other in the ways just specified.
b) Basic Facts about Speakers and Audiences who do not Share a Context
Sometimes the audience of an utterance doesn't share a context with the speaker. This can happen in any of several ways, the most salient of which being the reproduction of a speech act, as in published articles. Writers often have no idea who their reader is; they know next to nothing about her beliefs; or about her perceptual environment; all they know is that it is not shared. Yet, nonetheless, writers have audiences matter how small they might be.
Another typical device through which a speech act can reach an audience in another context is indirect quotation. This is when S says in C to A what another speaker S' said in another context C' to another audience A'. In these cases the sources of confusion are multiplied. The added complications should be obvious; there is not even the illusion of a shared context.
c) Basic Facts about Inter-Contextual Content Sharing
a. People can and often do say the same thing in different contexts.
People in different contexts can say that Napoleon was short.
b. According to Contextualists, no two contexts (are like to) share exactly the same content fixing parameters, e.g., the intentions are not the same; the background knowledge is not the same; previous conversations are not the same; what's normal is not the same; and so on. Let the semanticist use it if he or she wants to, provided he or she agrees that …the minimal proposition has no psychological reality. It does not correspond to any stage in the process of understanding the utterance, and need not be entertained or represented at any point in that process (Recanati, 2000, p.89 There is no reason to think that the resulting proposition is psychologically real.
Recanati discusses a version of this objection and the utter failure of his reply illustrates just how hard it is for Contextualists to satisfy their own psychological reality requirement. In particular, it illustrates why Recanati can't satisfy his Availability Principle (his version of the Psychological Requirement).
Hence my 'Availability Principle' (Recanati 1993: 248) , according to which 'what is said' must be analysed in conformity to the intuitions shared by those who fully understand the utterance -typically the speaker and the hearer, in a normal conversational setting. I take the conversational participants' intuitions concerning what is said to be revealed by their views concerning the utterance's truth-conditions. I assume that whoever fully understands a declarative utterance knows which state of affairs would possibly constitute a truth-maker for that utterance, i.e., knows in what sort of circumstance it would be true (Recanati, Literal Meaning, To determine what is said, we need to look at the interpretation that a normal interpreter would give. This is objective enough, yet remains within the confines of the pragmatic construal (Recanati, Literal Meaning, p.27 ).
But what's normal is not something speakers have psychological access to.
What's normal need not 'be in the speaker's mind when the sentence is understood'; it certainly needn't figure into any psychological processes that the speaker goes through when understanding (an utterance of) a sentence. This is so for several obvious reasons; here are perhaps the most obvious ones:
A speaker can be abnormal, but think that she is normal. A speaker might know that she is not normal, but not know what normal is. A speaker might think that she is not normal, but not be. More generally: Even for speakers who are normal and know that they are normal, they might not know what counts as a normal understanding of some specific feature of a context that they happen to find themselves in.
A lot of situations have no 'normal' set of expectations associated with them.
Suppose you meet someone in a cafe on a hot New York City summer day. What 'normality' are we looking for? Normal for you when talking to strangers in a cafe in New York City on a hot summer day? There's no such thing! In sum: the Semantic Minimalist has a response to the Psychological Objection; it is the Contextualist who surprisingly does not.
